Deduction, based on claims Kant makes about Wahrnehmung. 2 It has also led, on the other hand, to 'naïve direct realist' interpretations of outer intuition, Wahrnehmung, and experience, as all consisting in immediate acquaintance-like relations to ordinary physical objects, rather than as constituted by an immediate relation only to something mental or representational (namely: an appearance). 3 Here I aim to combat both trends by providing an account of what Kant means by 'Wahrnehmung' that is both sensitive to the term's distinctive use (along with 'perceptio') in Kant's historical context ( §2), and builds on this to clearly mark its difference in Kant's system from both intuition and experience ( §3). I conclude ( §4) by clarifying Kant's aim in one especially influential passage (the 'Stufenleiter') whose typically decontextualized analysis has stood as one of the main roadblocks to appreciating the importance of the distinction between Wahrnehmung and intuition.
2.
One important source for Kant's distinctions is Rudolph Goclenius's treatment of Yet however inviting this reading may be when the passage is viewed in isolation, once viewed in its broader context, the speciation reading simply cannot be sustained. The most glaring obstacle is the considerable effort Kant spends earlier in the Critique arguing that neither intuitions nor concepts (thoughts) on their own amount to cognitions of the objects they represent, and that it is only when they are 'unified' that cognition can arise 10 Cf. Prol § §18 et seq 04:288f; ÜE 08:217; Anth §1 07: 66, 413, 415, 463, 483, 487. (cf. B75f). He then returns to, and relies upon, this thesis at key points throughout the Analytic (B125, B146), the Dialectic (B367), and throughout his theoretical writings. The speciation reading, in effect, requires Kant to radically change his mind on a very fundamental point for these two pages.
Fortunately, this reading is not forced on us. Indeed, a natural alternative arises from our analysis above, since like his predecessors, we can see Kant here not as presenting a simple taxonomic division into species, but rather as highlighting key 'steps
[Stufen]' in the developmental 'progression [Stufenleiter] ' that obtains among our representations: our minds move from mere representation (sensation, intuition), to accompanying this representation 'with consciousness' (in Wahrnehmung), to cognizing or judging about an object 'through' perceptions (in experience). The passage simply means to signal that Wahrnehmung that has been made 'objective' in this way (in cognition, in experience) will include both intuition and concepts, and that the resulting cognition can therefore be analysed into parts or aspects which are either intuitions or concepts.
This 'progressivist' reading both rescues Kant from straightforward inconsistency and also brings out the deep accord between the Stufenleiter and the very similar progressions given in Kant's logic lectures, which likewise chart the development from mere representation, to perception ('with consciousness'), to cognition (as involving conceptual consciousness or 'understanding' of objects) -on, finally, to those representations which depend on reason (cf. Log 09:64-65; V-Lo/Dohna 24:730-31).
This is, of course, the progression which is writ large in the very structure of the Critique.
